This study examines the relationship between time discounting, other sources of time preference, and intertemporal choices about smoking. Using a survey fielded for our analysis, we elicit rates of time discount from choices in financial and health domains. We also examine the relationship between other determinants of time preference and smoking status. We find very high rates of time discount in the financial realm for a horizon of one year, irrespective of smoking status. In the health domain, the implied rates of time discount decline with the length of the time delay (hyperbolic discounting) and the sign of the payoff (the "sign effect"). We use a series of questions about the willingness to undergo a colonoscopy to elicit short-and long-run rates of discount in a quasi-hyperbolic discounting framework, finding no evidence that short-run and long-run rates of discount differ by smoking status. Using more general measures of time preference, i.e., impulsivity and length of financial planning horizon, smokers are more impatient. However, neither of these measures is significantly correlated with the measures of time discounting. Our results indicate that subjective rates of time discount revealed through committed choice scenarios are not related to differences in smoking behavior. Rather, a combination of more general measures of time preference and self-control, i.e., impulsivity and financial planning, are more closely related to the smoking decision.
I.

Introduction
The recent economics literature on anomalies of intertemporal choice and selfcontrol has been focused on alternatives to the standard assumption of exponential timediscounting. Building on Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968) , research by Laibson (1997) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) sparked a large new literature that explores the consequences of (quasi)-hyperbolic discounting in many areas, including savings behavior, labor, environmental, and health economics, and corporate finance. Models of hyperbolic discounting have often augmented or replaced the insights derived from standard models, rationalized puzzling behaviors, and generated new testable predictions. Importantly, certain welfare consequences of government policy have been shown to depend critically on whether consumers are (quasi-) hyperbolic rather than standard, exponential discounters (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2005) . For example, if agents are hyperbolic discounters, the welfare benefits of an increased tax on cigarettes may be greatly magnified because problems of self-control induce net costs of smoking that are internal to the smoker Köszegi 2001, 2004; Sloan, Ostermann, Picone et al. 2004 ).
This literature on hyperbolic discounting has grown rapidly, in part, because experimental evidence of hyperbolic discounting is voluminous. When choosing now to commit to present or future intertemporal tradeoffs, individuals commonly display declining (hyperbolic) rates of time discount. As Strotz (1956) first demonstrated, declining rates of time discount revealed by such committed choices imply time-inconsistency and problems of self-control when choices are uncommitted. There are, however, other potential sources of time preference and problems of self-control not reflected in time discount functions and thus the committed choices of individual decision makers. In models of dual selves (or cognitive processes) and of temptation costs, for example, present-biased time preference, tastes for commitment, and apparent time-inconsistency may emerge for reasons unrelated to the time discount function.
1 Recent empirical work is also consistent with the idea that substantially improving models of intertemporal choice may require more than the proper calibration of the discount function (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg 2001; Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy, 2003; Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy, and Tyler 2004) .
In this study, using data collected for our research, we examine the relationship between time discounting, other sources of time preference, and intertemporal choices about smoking. The decision to smoke represents an interremporal tradeoff with substantial implications for individual and social welfare, and thus provides a natural context in which to study these issues. We elicit rates of time discount from choices in both financial and health domains. We also examine the relationship between other determinants of time preference and smoking status. Specifically, we employ a proxy for respondents' degree of self-control using measures of impulsivity in individual behaviors. We investigate whether these and other measures of self-control differ by smoking status and to what extent these measures are correlated with subjective rates of time discount.
Using standard questions regarding committed intertemporal choices in the financial and health domains, we find patterns consistent with previous research on subjective rates of time discount. Responses to now standard hypothetical, choice scenarios reveal very high rates of time discount in the financial realm for a horizon of one year, irrespective of smoking status. Consistent with previous research, we find evidence that these implied rates of time discount decline with the length of the time delay, (hyperbolic discounting), and the sign of the payoff (the "sign effect"). We find the effect of size of stakes on choices for gains but not for losses (the "magnitude effect"). Further, we use a series of questions about the willingness to undergo a colonoscopy, a procedure recommended for all persons in the age group of respondents to our survey, irrespective of smoking status, to elicit short-and long-run rates of discount in a quasi-hyperbolic discounting framework. We find no evidence that short-run and long-run rates of discount differ by smoking status.
While several measures of time discounting in our data replicate patterns seen consistently in the literature, there is no correlation between these measures and smoking status. Our findings thus indicate that variation in time discounting is not a driving force behind differences in smoking behavior. However, we find that measures of impulsivity and length of financial planning horizon are related to smoking decisions. Those who, according to a composite measure reflecting a tendency for emotional rather than thoughtful responses to external circumstances, are more impulsive are also significantly more likely to have or continue to smoke. 2 Similarly, current smokers tend to have shorter financial planning horizons, even conditional on their longevity expectations. Neither of these measures of planning or self-control is significantly correlated with the standard measures of time discounting. Although we find that subjective rates of time discount revealed through committed choice scenarios are unrelated to differences in smoking behavior, a combination of more general measures of self-control, impulsivity and financial planning, is related to the smoking decision.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes our data source and shows how the smokers in these data exhibit many of the characteristics and behaviors noted previously in the literature. Section III presents our methods and results regarding subjective rates of time discount in the financial and health domains, and their relationship to smoking decisions. This section ends with analysis of alternative sources of time preference--impulsivity and length of planning horizon. Section IV concludes.
II. Data
Our analysis relies on data from the Survey on Smoking (SOS Seattle, Washington. There were three interviews: a screener to determine age eligibility and smoking status administered by telephone; a second longer interview also conducted by telephone; and an in-person computer-assisted interview. All information used in this paper came from the screener and the longer telephone interview. Given the study questions, the SOS is more comprehensive in asking questions about time preference, self control, and impulsivity than are previous surveys on smoking.
The SOS sample consisted of adults aged 50-70 at the interview date, who were current, former, or never smokers. At this age, never-smokers are very unlikely to start (Sloan, Smith, and Taylor 2003) . The most relevant decision in this group is therefore whether to quit smoking. The decision to quit smoking is both common and consequential for health, even at older ages. 3 To the extent that traits such as time discounting rates or degrees of impulsivity are permanent, our analysis also sheds light on the decision to start smoking.
Since much of the survey dealt with smoking status, current smokers were oversampled. The analysis sample from the first survey consisted of 663 individuals, 252 current, 257 former, and 154 never smokers. The response rate for the longer telephone interview was approximately 80%. The analysis sample from the follow-up survey consisted of 431 individuals, of whom 149 were current, 165 former, and 117 were never smokers. The follow-up survey included questions on time discounting in the health domain, risk preference, and the value of avoiding smoking-related illness.
Descriptive statistics for the sample of persons who responded to both SOS surveys and the sample of those who only responded to the first survey are shown in Table 1 .
Higher proportions of current and former smokers responded to both surveys and a correspondingly lower proportion of never smokers responded to both. On average, persons who responded to both surveys had lower educational attainment. Persons who responded to both surveys also had lower self-reported health on average.
Stylized facts about smokers reported by others (see e.g., Brigham 1998, Sloan, Smith, and Taylor 2003; Sloan, Ostermann, Picone et al. 2004 , Slovic 2001 are also found in the SOS data (not shown in Table 1 ), although respondents to the SOS are much older than respondents to the vast majority of previous surveys on smoking. The mean age at which individuals begin smoking is 16.7 years. Current smokers consume between 11 and 20 cigarettes a day. Of current smokers, 84.9% said that they had tried quitting in the past.
The mean age at which they first tried to quit was 37.3 years. On average, they had quit for more than a month on 1.71 occasions. For persons who were former smokers at the interview date, the number of quit attempts for longer than a month was 1.98. Among current smokers, 76.2% said that they would like to quit smoking. Important reasons for relapses among current smokers who had quit were stress (41.2%), habit or physical addiction (13.7%), and desire to be social (13.1%). Major factors that led to quitting were health shocks (44.4%), 4 precaution against future health shocks (13.6%), and for family reasons (11.3%).
These facts indicate that (1) a substantial number of persons quit, (2) many people try to quit and relapse, (3) a minority of people who have ever smoked have never tried to quit, and (4) judging from the reasons people give for quitting and relapsing, more is at work than simple physical addiction. Only 13.7 percent of current smokers report relapsing because they are physically addicted. Taken together, these patterns of behavior are consistent with problems of self-control and a taste for commitment.
Indeed, in the SOS, the vast majority of smokers use commitment devices to curb their smoking, implying that they are aware of a self control problem. The SOS asked, "To limit my smoking, I buy packs rather than cartons. Do you: disagree strongly, disagree, disagree somewhat, agree somewhat, agree, and agree strongly?" Twenty-seven percent of current smokers said that they at least somewhat agreed with the statement that they buy The literature on hyperbolic discounting has also been motivated in part by an observation that people resort to various commitment devices that would not be used by time-consistent expected utility maximizers. A stylized fact used by Gruber and Köszegi (2001) to motivate their analysis of smoking decisions is that smokers are unable to carry out their own plans for levels of future cigarette consumption. Gruber and Köszegi state that "unrealized intentions to quit at some future date are a common feature of stated smoker preferences" (p.1279). They provide evidence that, among high school seniors, 56% claimed that they would quit in five years, but only 31% quit in that time.
Evidence from much older respondents to the SOS is consistent with this finding.
The SOS question was "Roughly how many cigarettes do you expect to smoke per day two years from now?" Those smokers who said that would be smoking zero cigarettes were classified as self-assessed quitters. The self-assessed probability of quitting was compared with actual quit rates computed from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a national longitudinal survey of persons aged over 50. 6 The mean subjective probability from SOS of having quit in two years was 0.41. In the HRS, by comparison, the corresponding, objective 5 Commitment devices listed other than buying packs rather than cartons: (1) keep busy, keep hands busy, work out in the yard, do a lot of reading and crossword puzzles, washing dishes and cleaning, talk to someone on the telephone; (2) stop smoking in the house, go outside, no smoking at work, put myself in places where smoking is not allowed; (3) keep diary to see when last smoked, limit myself to one cigarette each half an hour, leave cigarette burning after two puffs, smoke first half of cigarette, do not smoke early in the morning; (4) chew gum or hard candy, eating, I brush my teeth when I got a big craving for a cigarette, drink water; (5) put cigarettes out of reach when I am at home, try not to have any in the house, don't take them with me; (6) patch, medicine; (7) avoid other smokers. 6 See Juster and Suzman (1995) for details.
two-year quit rate was 0.16.
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Like youths, mature smokers thus appear to be overly optimistic about quitting. This is further evidence that people have difficulty implementing their plans about intertemporal consumption, at least in the context of smoking.
III. Methods and Results
III. A. Time Discounting in the Financial Domain
Much of the evidence discussed in the previous subsection is qualitatively consistent with the problems of self-control that would emerge from hyperbolic time discounting. In this section we begin our direct examination of time discounting with the responses to intertemporal tradeoffs in the financial domain. The first SOS interview asked four questions about winning or losing money now versus a year from now. The questions were worded as "Would you rather win (lose) $x now or $y a year from now?" Values of x were set at $20 or $1,000, and values of y were $30 and alternatively $1,500. This allowed us to gauge whether the stakes involved affect the choices. These questions reveal preferences under commitment, and thus reflect the standard measure of subjective time discounting.
To evaluate whether rates of time discounting in the financial domain differ by smoking status and by the amounts at stake, we run regressions of the following form: an indicator for the choice of losing $1,500 a year later or $1,000 now (choice of winning $1,000 now versus $1,500 a year later is the omitted group).
We find that 51% of respondents would rather win $1,000 now than $1,500 in a year ( Table 2, Importantly, the coefficients on smoking status indicate no difference in financial tradeoffs by smoking status.
We repeat the analysis separately for each of the smoking groups, and find that the parameters are very similar among the groups (Table 2 , cols. 2-4). We conclude that (1) there is evidence for both the sign and magnitude effects found previously in the literature but, (2) time discounting as measured by these financial tradeoff questions does not differ by smoking status.
II. B. Time Discounting in the Health Domain
In this section, we investigate the relationship between time discounting and the decision to smoke using questions about the health domain.We do this in the health domain as it is plausibly the appropriate domain to examine time discounting for health-related intertemporal choices such as smoking. We assume that utility is linear with respect to these extra days of health, pool all responses to all questions and run regressions of the following form:
where t5 i , t10 i , and t20 i are indicator variables for the relevant comparison years and number of extra days a year from now is the omitted group.
When the time horizon involves a comparison of equivalence of 20 healthy days this year versus healthy days a year from now, for never smokers, ρ is estimated to be 0.5 (Table 3 , col. 1). The implied discount rate is extremely large, which is similar to our finding for financial discount rates based on a horizon of one year (see Table 1 ). However, when the comparison is extra healthy days in five, 10, and 20 years from now versus 20 extra healthy days this year, the estimate of ρ decreases to 0.14, 0.08, and 0.05, respectively. Thus the implied rate of time discount declines sharply as the tradeoff is pushed futher into the future. We find no differences by smoking status. In columns 3-5, we stratify by smoking status and find results that are qualitatively similar to the pooled findings.
disentangle these two effects, it is sufficient to keep constant the interval between the two choices while varying period between the present and when the later outcome is to be realized. The questions used in this part of the analysis follow conventions of the literature and are subject to Read's critique. Hence, as described in the following section, the SOS asked another set of questions to measure time discounting that are not subject to this critique.
III. B.2. Months of Life Extention from Colonoscopy
Quasi-hyperbolic time discounting has been proposed as a potential explanation for continued smoking (Gruber and Köszegi 2001) . In this subsection, we seek direct evidence of short-and long-run discount factors and examine whether or not these differ by smoking status.
We again use a survey-based approach for estimating the short-and long-run discount factors. The second interview of the SOS contained a series question about the longevity benefit needed at different points in time for the respondent to be willing to undergo a colonoscopy. Colonoscopy is a procedure to screen and prevent colon cancer and requires uncomfortable preparations. Although unpleasant and time consuming, the procedure is highly accurate in detecting polyps or tumors in the colon and is recommended for persons in the SOS age cohort, irrespective of smoking status (Singh, Turner, Xue et al. 2006 ). The procedure involves a substantial cost in time and unpleasantness but offers a potentially large benefit in terms of increased longevity. These characteristics make questions about a colonoscopy a good instrument for eliciting rates of time discounting from nonsmokers and smokers alike in the health domain. After presenting a description of the procedure and the required preparation, the SOS asked respondents to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 the degree of discomfort associated with the procedure, based on the description they just heard. Since the vast majority of persons are likely to have had insurance for this procedure, time and discomfort involved are plausibly the major costs to individuals of having a colonoscopy. There were no statistically significant differences in the mean rating of discomfort between current and never and former and never smokers.
We elicit discount rates using responses to intertemporal choices about willingness to undergo colonoscopy. The SOS asked three questions about the payoff in terms of added life expectancy required for the individual to choose to get a colonoscopy. Before asking the questions, respondents were instructed in what having a colonoscopy entails.
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Assuming a finite lifespan consisting of periods indexed by t. For each individual i at time t, the SOS elicited the individual's subjective life expectancy (N it ). The first colonoscopy question sought to determine the number of months of added life expectancy (X 1i ) needed to induce the person to get a colonoscopy now. 12 For individual i, let c i be the 11 This is the text explaining to respondents what a colonoscopy entails. This explanation was provided before the sequence of questions about willingness to undergo this procedure were asked. "People differ in how they think about the value of preventive care. The following items are about a preventive test that many people receive after the age of 50. The procedure is called a colonoscopy. o The colon is the large intestine. This procedure is the best method for screening patients for colon cancer.
By preventing colon cancer, life can often be extended as some of the disability and discomfort from the disease can often be avoided. Before the doctor begins the procedure, the patient is given anesthesia to reduce discomfort from the procedure. Because the patient may be sleepy afterwards, it is necessary for someone to drive the patient to the clinic where the procedure is done. o A colonoscope, a long flexible tubular instrument, is inserted into the rectum. The other end of the scope has video visualization enabling the physician to directly inspect the lining of the colon. Other instruments, such as biopsy forceps, can be passed through the colonoscope to perform certain surgical procedures. Before the procedure: o Colonoscopy can be performed in either hospitals or outpatient surgical centers. It is very important to follow the instructions carefully because the colon must be completely clean for a successful test. o The patient is asked not to eat or drink anything for at least 8 hours before the colonoscopy. A clear liquid diet is required the day before the exam.
The patient also takes a liquid bowel stimulant the day before the procedure to cleanse out the colon."
instantaneous disutility of having a colonoscopy, and V i (N it -t) be the utility of the anticipated remaining years of life at t. If the annual rate of time discount is ρ γ + in the first year, and ρ in the subsequent years, then if the individual is indifferent between having a colonoscopy and receiving X 1i additional years of life, we get an indifference equation of the following form:
where the additional months of life required to achieve this indifference (X 1i ) arrive at the end of the expected life time and are therefore discounted by . The parameter α 
7.3 percent of responses were left-censored at 6 months and 0.3 percent of responses were right-censored at 5 years. We assume values at these limits in cases in which persons gave left-or right-censored values.
The second question was phrased as: "Suppose you were told that by having the colonoscopy a year from now, you could extend your life expectancy from (N to N+ X 2 ) years, would you be willing to have the procedure a year from now?" The SOS followed the same rules for picking starting values and determining values for the censored observations as in Question 1. 7.7 percent of values were left-and 0.7 percent of values were right-censored.
The third question was phrased as: "Now suppose that your life expectancy was (N+1), that is, your life expectancy was extended by a year from the life expectancy you gave me earlier, and suppose you were told that by having a colonoscopy a year from now, you could extend your life expectancy from (N+1 to N+1+X 3 ) years, would you be willing to have the procedure a year from now?" The SOS followed the same rules for picking starting values and determining values for the censored observations as in Question 1. 11.0 percent of values were left-and 0.8 percent of values were right-censored.
The cost of a colonoscopy is unchanged but is discounted since the colonoscopy is delayed by a year. The second indifference equation implies Equations (4) and (5) 
We use the recovered values of ρ and γ to determine whether or not there is hyperbolic discounting and whether or not there are differences in discounting by smoking status.
As a preliminary step, we run regressions with the dependent variable being the months needed to be willing to get a colonoscopy of the form:
X i = α + θ* cs i + µ* fs i +φ* Q1 i +γ*Q3 i +ε i (6), where the dependent variable X i is the response to questions 1, 2, or 3, and Q1 i (Q3 i ) is an indicator variable for question 1 (3); the omitted category is question 2.
Never smokers require an additional 13.25 months to their life expectancy on average to undergo a colonoscopy now (Table 4 , col. 1). 13 To have a colonoscopy a year from now, such persons require 1.02 months less additional life expectancy. When individuals are queried about getting a colonoscopy a year from now assuming their life expectancy is also increased by a year, then such persons require 1.36 months less than if they were to have the colonoscopy now.
Our mean estimate of the extra months of longevity people require to have a colonscopy exceed estimates of the objective longevity return to the procedure (Lin, Kozarek, Schembre et al. 2006 ). For person of mean age in the SOS sample, the mean life extension from having a colonoscopy is 7.6 months. 14 This gap should be viewed in light of the fact that the most recent published results appeared two years after the SOS was conducted. Also, the SOS elicited the asking price, which given that many persons in this age group do not get colonoscopies, should be higher on average than the objective amount 13 The SOS allowed responses to the colonoscopy questions to vary from 6 months to 59 months. As a result, 7.3 percent of the observations to question 1 were left-censored and 0.3 percent were right-censored. We used the mid-point between 0 and 6 months for the left-censored observations and an equal number of extra months for the right-censored observations. For question 2, 7.7 percent of observations were left-censored, and none were right-censored. For question 3, 11.0 percent of observations were left-and 0.8 percent were rightcensored. To gauge the sensitivity of our findings to assumptions made about the value used for right-censoring, we substituted a value of 75 months for the value of 62.25 months used in the main calculations. There was virtually no change in the results. of life extension. In view of these considerations, the stated asking prices obtained from SOS respondents are overall quite reasonable. Our finding that fewer months are required to induce a colonoscopy if performed a year from now is consistent with discounting, either exponential or hyperbolic. However, compared to responses from the second question, delaying benefits by a year in the third question should have led to more rather than fewer months being required to have a colonoscopy. Although the difference is 0.36 of a month, the difference is in the wrong direction. We speculate that this disprepancy may reflect non-linear utility for longevity (or decreasing marginal utility of a lifeyear). Importantly, there are no statistically significant differences by smoking status just as for the analysis of the financial tradeoff and extra healthy days questions reported above.
To obtain estimates of ρ γ + and ρ , we estimate two regressions together of the following form:
ln(X 1i /X 2i ) = α + θ* cs i + µ* fs i +φ* r i +ε i (7a) and ln(X 3i /X 2i ) = α + θ* cs i + µ* fs i +φ* r i +ε i (7b), where X 1i , X 2i , and X 3i are responses to the first, second, and third colonoscopy questions, respectively, and r i is an indicator with the value zero if the dependent variable is from (7a) and the value one if the dependent various is from (7b).
The estimate of the sum of the parameters ρ γ + for never smokers, the omitted group, is negative but statistically insignificant as is the estimate of ρ (Table 5 , col. 1),
implying that the discount factors are not statistically different from one. There are no statistically significant differences by smoking status. In column 2, which is based on the sample of current smokers, the estimate of ρ γ + is 0.073 and the estimate of ρ is -0.077, implying that γ for current smokers is about 0.14. Both parameter estimates are not statistically significant from zero, as in column 1. In column 3, for former smokers, ρ γ + is -0.030 and the estimate of ρ is -0.044, implying that γ for current smokers is slightly positive. However, these estimates also are not statistically significant. Finally, in column 4, for never smokers, ρ γ + is -0.083 and the estimate of ρ is 0.074, implying that γ for current smokers is negative, which is opposite of the pattern of current smokers. Since these too are insignificant, we do not attach great importance to these differences in parameter estimates. The reason why our point estimates of ρ γ + are negative in column 1
is that respondents required fewer months for a colonoscopy when the benefits were delayed by a year in the third question. Importantly, a pattern consistent with the responses to questions discussed above is that there are no statistically significant differences by smoking status.
To our knowledge, the SOS is the first attempt to elicit short-and long-run rates of time preference this way. Overall, the estimated additional years of life required to be willing to obtain a colonoscopy are within a plausible range. Fewer than 10 percent of responses were either left-or right censored. However, the questions became increasing mentally taxing (especially the third question). While the approach is promising, we make two suggestions for future research. First, respondents should be given a few practice questions (perhaps in the financial domain) to learn how to respond to the time discounting concepts in the context of a structured survey. Second, the survey should account for the possibility that the marginal utility of a life year may decline as longevity is extended.
III. C. Alternative Sources of Time Preferences
III. C. 1. Planning
Thus far, we have assessed differences in time discounting. We now investigate a more general framework which allows other psychological motives to enter in intertemporal decisions. We begin with an examination of the financial planning horizon.
The length of the planning horizon should capture longevity expectations, but also other factors such as planning ability or more general problems of self control (Ameriks, Caplan, and Leahy 2003) . The SOS telephone interview asked respondents "In planning your savings and spending, which of the following time periods is most important to you and your household?" Choices available to respondents were: "the next few months, the next year, the next few years, the next 5-10 years, longer than 10 years."
We estimated an equation of the following form:
where z i is the length in years of the person's planning horizon, p i is the individual's subjective probablity of surviving to age 75, and A i is the person's age. Together, p i and A i measure the person's expected longevity, which would influence the person's planning horizon. We convert responses to questions for discrete planning horizon categories to a continuous measure in years as follows: < year = 0.5 year; next year = 1 year; next few years = 2.5 years; next 5-10 years = 7.5 years; and longer than 10 years = 20 years. Since the final category was open-ended, in an alternative specification, we replace 20 with 10 years to examine robustness of our findings to our assumption about the mean value of the response category.
Without controlling for other factors, current smokers have shorter financial planning horizons, irrespective of the value assigned to the open-ended category (Table 6, cols. 1 and 3). Using a 20-year value (10-year value) for the open-ended category, current smokers on average have a financial planning horizon which is 1.7 years (1.2 years) less than for never smokers. Planning horizons of former smokers do not differ from those of never smokers. The observed difference between current and never smokers is reduced to 1.2 years (0.9) when we control for age and the subjective probability of living to age 75.
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Thus, some but not all of the observed difference between current and never smokers in financial horizon is due to the individuals' subjective beliefs about longevity.
In sum, current smokers have a shorter financial planning horizon than never smokers. This suggests that smokers are more present-oriented in ways not captured by the above analysis of time discounting. The questions regarding financial planning horizons seem to reflect determinants of time preference that are independent of both time discounting and longevity expectations. Hence, in the next section, we explore differences by smoking status with a still more general measure of time preference.
III. C. 2. Impulsivity
In this subsection, we measure a still more general source of time preference and relate it to the smoking decision. We use impulsivity as a measure of an individual's ability to set goals and to exercise self-control. The telephone interview of SOS recovered impulsivity using a series of 14 statements, such as "I make hasty decisions," I do not control my temper," and "I act on impulse." 16 Respondents were asked whether they "disagree strongly," "disagree," "neither disagree nor agree," "agree," or "strongly agree"
with each of these statements. The actual wording of the questions varied so that "strongly agree" sometimes implied high self-control and low impulsivity and sometimes implied the opposite. In our analysis, we convert the answers to a consistent form in which "strongly agree" always implies high impulsivity and low self-control.
We create an index of impulsivity and self-control by converting the responses to a five-point scale with "disagree strongly" =1 and "agree strongly" =5 and summing the scores for individual items. 17 The index varies from 14 to 70 with higher values implying greater impulsivity. In Fig. 1 , which shows the distribution of scores by smoking status, proportionally more current smokers than others have scores of 40 and above.
To examine differences in the index by smoking status, we estimate an equation regression of the form
where b i is the index defined above an indicator variable equal to 1 if the person elects to receive or pay the money now and is 0 otherwise, H i is a vector of demographic characteristics.
On average, never smokers have an index of 33.9 (Table 7 , col. 1). Current smokers on average have an index which is 2.1 points higher. For former smokers, the index is 2.2 points higher. These means are quite tightly estimated and, thus, both current and former smokers are significantly more impulsive than never smokers.
Controlling for years of education, gender, race, and age, the index for never smokers rises to 34.7. The difference for current smokers is 1.5 and former smokers is 1.7.
Education makes people less impulsive; males tend to be more impulsive on average. As with financial planning, smokers tend to be more impulsive which is a more general measure of time preference. This result is robust to controls for important demographic characteristics.
Our results thus indicate that there is not much difference in time discounting by smoking status, but there are differences in measures of time preference related to financial planning and other measures of self-control as reflected in our index of impulsivity. Within domains, measures of time discounting are positively correlated, but not across financial and health domains (Table 8) . Financial planning horizon is positively correlated with financial discounting. There is a negative correlation between financial planning horizon and the impulsivity index, suggesting that financial planning reflects both time discounting and other elements of time preference.
IV. Conclusion
Based on data from a survey fielded for our research, our key finding is that there are no significant differences in time discounting by smoking status. While our results replicate various patterns in time discounting that have been used to explain time inconsistency in intertemporal decision making--in particular, declining rates of time discounting as the time period is extended, the average time discount function of smokers is not different from that of non-smokers. Differences in smoking behavior late in life, therefore seem likely to reflect factors other than time discounting.
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Subtler patterns reported previously in the literature on time discounting also appeared in our data: the measured rates of time discount reflected a dependence on magnitude, sign and domain that the previous literature has also noted. Our respondents demonstrated considerable over-optimism about quitting rates and substantial reliance on commitment devices. In this sense, much of our evidence is consistent with hyperbolic discounting. Nevertheless, we find little evidence that differences in rates of time discount are importantly related to differences in smoking decisions. Our findings are in contrast to those of a seminal study (Fuchs 1982) , which examined associations between financial rates of time preference and smoking. Our results suggest that it is inappropriate to proxy time preference with measures of smoking behavior. Our findings thus provide further motivation for models that "open the black box"
of time preference to model and investigate the behavioral implications of alternative psychological processes. Rather than identifying smoking simply with higher rates of time discount or more present-biased time discounting, our results indicate that smoking may be a marker for greater problems of self-control that emerge through other channels.
Specifically, the relative strength of the relationship between measures of impulsivity, planning horizons and smoking decisions points toward a growing literature that models ideas such as costly-self control, dual selves and decision processes, and cue-theories of consumption. Our findings indicate that, in the smoking domain, the predictions of such modeling may prove a useful complement to research on alternatives to the standard exponential discount function. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Omitted groups are winning $1,000 now v. $1,500 a year from now and never smokers. *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%. Omitted groups: get colonoscopy now and never smoker. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *: significant at 5%; **: significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *: significant at 5% level; **: significant at 1% level. 37
